On the consequences of university patenting: What can we learn by asking directly to academic inventors?

This paper examines the consequences of university patenting by using an original source of information: The point of view of French academic inventors, i.e. French university professors who are also inventors of European patents. Via a survey we collected information about 280 French academic inventors. This enables us to put forward new insights with respect to the effect of university patenting on the diffusion of scientific research, incentives to do basic research, commercialization of university inventions and access to upstream knowledge. In particular, the study suggests a tradeoff between enabling the transfer of university inventions to industry in some sectors and delaying the dissemination of scientific research. On the one hand, most academic inventors acknowledge a lag in their publication process directly attributable to the patent application but, on the other hand, in life science disciplines a large majority of respondents who have had one of their inventions commercialized, believe that this would not have been the case had a patent not been there.University patenting, open science, intellectual property rights, technology transfer, university-industry relationships, Bayh-Dole Act.

More open than open innovation? Rethinking the concept of openness in innovation studies.

This paper re-examines the concept of open innovation developed in organization sciences (Chesbrough, 2003a). We claim that this paradigm, which insists on the distributive nature of innovation among a wide range of heterogeneous actors, does not put enough emphasis on the condition of access to knowledge. Yet, the open dimension of knowledge is a very important feature to sustain a collective mode of innovation. We propose therefore a stronger definition of open innovation, which is based on three constitutive characteristics: (i) Firms voluntarily release knowledge; (ii) Knowledge is open, i.e. is available to all interested parties without discrimination; (iii) dynamic interactions take place among the stakeholders to enrich the open knowledge base. Examples that fit our definition of open innovation are open science, user centered innovation (von Hippel, 2005), free-libre open source software, collective invention (Allen, 1983), etc. We conclude with a discussion on the role of IPR to secure open innovation.open source, free software, intellectual property rights (IPR), open innovation, collective invention.

Patents versus ex-post rewards : a new look

Studies that aim at comparing the patent system social efficiency versus an ex-post reward system rest on a traditional view of patents. They make the hypothesis that firms use the patent system only in order to be granted a short-term monopoly rent and therefore that patents lead to strong and steady monopolies. This assumption is convenient because it allows straightforward comparisons between patent and reward systems. But empirical studies do not confirm this vision of patents. Most firms do not consider patents as efficient devices to exploit commercial monopoly positions. Patents are rather perceived as strategic devices to signal firms' competences and to strengthen firms' bargaining power during negotiations prior to knowledge exchange and to R&D cooperation. These changes lead to rethink the framework of the patent-reward debate.Patent, ex-post reward, R&D cooperation, cross-licensing, knowledge exchange

Patents versus ex-post rewards: a new look.

Economic studies that aim at comparing the patent system social efficiency versus an ex-post reward system rest on a traditional view of patents. They make the hypothesis that firms use the patent system only in order to be granted a short-term monopoly rent and therefore that patents lead to strong and steady monopolies. This assumption is convenient because it allows straightforward comparisons between patent and reward systems. But empirical studies do not confirm this vision of patents. Most firms do not consider patents as efficient devices to exploit commercial monopoly positions. Patents are rather perceived as strategic devices to signal firms’ competences and to strengthen firms’ bargaining power during negotiations prior to knowledge exchange and to R&D cooperation. These changes lead to rethink the framework of the patent-reward debate.Patent, ex-post reward, R&D cooperation, cross-licensing, knowledge exchange.

The determinants of scientific research agenda: Why do academic inventors choose to perform patentable versus non-patentable research?

This paper explores the determinants of scientific research agenda. By using an original dataset that includes extensive information about 269 French academic inventors, we analyze why scientists choose to perform patentable versus non-patentable research. Usually economic studies tackle this problem by using the number of invented patents as a proxy of researchers’ willingness to perform patentable research. The originality of the paper is that, in addition to the number of invented patents, we rely on a survey-base dependant variable that indicates whether or not scientists acknowledge orienting deliberately their research towards patentable areas. Our results indicate that past experience with respect to patenting activity matters: academic inventors who have already experienced a successful technology transfer are more inclined to orient their research towards patentable domains. Similarly, the institutional environment plays an explanatory role, whereas conversely, scientific discipline, age and individual research performance do not seem to affect the decision to orient research towards patentable areas. Yet, age and scientific performance positively influence the number of patents scholars effectively invent.University, patent, scientific agenda, technology transfer, academic inventors.

Research Tool Patents and Free-Libre Biotechnology: A Unified Perspective.

This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework to analyse the multiple role and consequences of patents in the case of biotechnology research tools. We argue that the knowledge/information and independent/complementary nature of research tools define heterogeneous frameworks in which the patent system plays different roles. In particular, using the analogy with the free-libre open source movement in software, we show that patents can promote open innovation by ensuring the freedom of some pieces of knowledge. A strong conclusion of the paper is therefore that, against common belief, an adequate use of the patent system may contribute to preserving freedom of access to upstream research tools within a framework that we call free-libre biotechnology.Intellectual property rights, sequential innovation, open source, life science, collective invention.

Quelle politique de licence de brevet pour les organismes publics de recherche ? Exclusivité versus modèles plus ouverts

Partout dans le monde les organismes publics de recherche (OPR) ont adopté des politiques quasi systématiques de brevetage de leurs inventions. Les conséquences économiques de ce changement ont été largement documentées. Cependant, peu a été écrit en ce qui concerne les stratégies d’exploitation du brevet par les OPR. Nous montrons ici que, si les entreprises ont depuis longtemps compris l’importance d’une utilisation différenciée du brevet en fonction des contextes, c’est loin d’être le cas des OPR, qui restent généralement enfermés dans une vision restrictive du brevet basée sur la délivrance de licences exclusives. Or, une politique d’exclusivité n’est de loin pas l’unique option pour les OPR. Dans certaines situations, que nous définissons, il s’avère plus efficace pour favoriser le transfert de technologie et de connaissances, d’adopter des modèles de licence plus ouverts, basés sur des licences non-exclusives ou sur des stratégies de type « open source ».All over the world, public research organizations (PRO) have adopted a policy of systematic patenting over their research results. Economic consequences of this change have been widely documented. Yet, less has been written on the way PRO use their intellectual property. We show here that, although firms have for long understood the importance of a contextualized use of their patent portfolios, it is not the case of PRO, which remain locked into a restrictive view of patents based on exclusivity. But a policy of exclusive licensing is not the only option for PRO. In some cases, that we attempt to define, it is more efficient in order to foster technology transfer, to adopt more open model of use, based on non-exclusive licenses or on open source strategies.En todas partes del mundo los organismos públicos de investigación (OPI) adoptaron políticas casi sistemáticas de patentado de sus invenciones. Las consecuencias económicas de este cambio han sido ampliamente documentadas. Sin embargo, poco ha sido escrito sobre las estrategias de explotación de la patente por las OPI. Demostramos aquí que, si las empresas han entendido desde hace tiempo la importancia de un uso diferenciado de la patente en función del contexto, no es el caso de las OPI, que se quedan generalmente encerradas en una visión restrictiva de la patente basada en la exclusividad de las licencias otorgadas. Ahora bien, una política de exclusividad no es la única opción para las OPI. En algunos casos, que explicamos, resulta más eficiente adoptar modelos de licencias más abiertos, basados en las licencias no exclusivas o en estrategias de tipo “open source” para favorecer la transferencia de tecnología y de conocimiento

Enveloppe Soleau et droit de possession antérieure : Définition et analyse économique.

En France, les brevets sont attribués au premier à déposer la demande et non pas au premier inventeur. Cependant, ce système dit de first to file est accompagné par la règle de droit de possession antérieure qui accorde au premier inventeur le droit de continuer à utiliser son invention même si elle a été brevetée par une autre entreprise. Le recours aux enveloppes Soleau permet ainsi aux inventeurs de prendre date et éventuellement de revendiquer un droit de possession antérieure si l’innovation est ensuite brevetée par un tiers. Cet article discute des conséquences économiques d’un tel système aussi bien en ce qui concerne les incitations à innover que la diffusion des connaissances. Nous insistons notamment sur le caractère complémentaire des stratégies de dépôt de brevet et d’enveloppe Soleau. Au final, ce travail soulève plusieurs questions auxquelles les études ultérieures devront tenter de répondre.Brevet d’invention, droit de propriété intellectuelle, système français d’innovation, incitations.

Entrepreneurship in biotechnology: The case of four start-ups in the Upper-Rhine Biovalley.

This paper explores entrepreneurship in biotech through the in depth analysis of four new ventures located in the Upper-Rhine Biovalley. One of the strengths of this paper is the presence of both successful cases of entrepreneurship and of cases of failures. This gives the opportunity to discuss the role of several factors on the performance of a new biotech venture. Three points particularly comes out of this study: The importance of public science, without which new biotech firms could hardly exist; the role of the patent system, the importance of which we link to the business model adopted by the firm; and the importance of collaborations, which we study through the concept of distributed entrepreneurship.Intellectual property rights, patents, science, distributed entrepreneurship, collective invention.

Intellectual property in a knowledge-based economy : Patents to include vs. patents to exclude.

The traditional perception of patents puts the emphasis on their importance to exclude imitators and to restore incentives to invent. This view is far too restrictive and at variance with many empirical and theoretical works. We show that these contradictions can be overcome by shifting from a traditional economic framework to a knowledge-based one. Such a move allows a renewed economic perception of patents, making them into essential instruments which serve not only to exclude potential infringers but also to “include” all the different stakeholders in the innovation process. Within this new approach the main role of the patent system is therefore to ensure the coordination among heterogeneous actors and to structure innovation activities. We illustrate our view by presenting the four polar cases of pharmaceuticals, electronics, software and biotechnologies.Intellectual property rights, incentives, coordination, R&D collaboration, collective invention.